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Abstract
This paper presents a test of intermodal interaction between coaches and 
airlines in Brazil in order to check for the efficacy of recent liberalization 
measures designed to promote competition in both industries. Interstate 
travel service in the country is heavily provided by coaches, and the system 
is fully operated by the private sector under public delegation through 
permits and authorizations. Agency-based regulation was introduced in 
2002 along with a price cap regime aimed at enhancing the flexibility to 
change fares in response to demand and cost conditions. By making use of 
a reaction function-based model of coach operators’ pricing decisions in 
the interstate travel market, we then estimate the sensitivity of the changes 
in coach fares to the changes in airline fares in a simultaneous-equation 
framework. Intermodal interaction among coach operators and airlines is 
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I.  Introduction
This paper aims at developing an empirical model of pricing decisions for the 
interstate travel market in Brazil, in order to investigate potential intermodal competi-
tion. Interstate travel service within the country is heavily provided by coaches, which 
account for roughly ninety five percent of passengers; travel by plane is nowadays a 
potential substitute, although air tickets –usually much more expensive relatively to 
coach travel– are still unaffordable to the majority of coach travelers. We expect that 
intermodal interaction among coach operators and airlines may emerge as a result 
of a competition for a small but increasing set of premium, quality-sensitive, coach 
passengers, who may be willing to pay for air travel during airline fare wars.
Intermodal interaction may be regarded as a relevant issue nowadays, and yet to 
be further investigated by the literature; notable examples are Wardman (1997), and 
Ivaldi and Vibes (2005). In fact, Wardman (1997) points out that “relatively little is 
known about the interaction between modes in the inter-urban travel market”.
The system of interstate travel by coach in Brazil is fully operated by the private 
sector under public delegation, through permits and authorizations. Agency-based 
regulation was introduced in 2002 and this new regulatory framework may allow 
for further advances in competition. A price cap regime was introduced in order to 
enhance competition among operators, although it is still not possible to set prices 
below the tariff ceiling without previous communication to the agency.
By analyzing pricing decisions of operators in some cities within the country, here 
we intend to investigate potential price sensitivity to cost components and competitive 
pressure from airlines; the latter became certainly more relevant after the liberalization 
of the airline industry, during the nineties, and the recent entry of the first low cost 
airline of Latin America, Gol Linhas Aéreas, in January 2001 (Oliveira, 2008).
The paper is organized in five parts. Section II discusses the relevant features of 
the interstate travel market in Brazil; Section III presents the theoretical framework of 
intermodal competition; Section IV develops the empirical model of pricing decisions by 
coach operators along with estimation results; and finally, conclusions are presented.
II.  The Interstate Travel Market in Brazil
Road transportation is a key sector of the Brazilian economy. Since the late fif-
ties, when the federal government adopted the strategy of boosting and promoting 
the development of the local automobile industry, the majority of people and cargo in 
the interstate travel market has been extensively carried on highways. Brazil has 1.8 
million kilometers of highways, but only ten percent of these are paved. Of the total, 
approximately sixty thousand kilometers are paved federal highways1.
found to be highly significant and probably due to the competition for a 
small but increasing set of premium, quality-sensitive, coach passengers.
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Figure 1 presents a map with the main federal and state highways within the 
country.
Although the national highway system is the second of the world in size3, it is 
traditionally marked by public and private underinvestment with perverse effects on 
the quality of the service provided by carriers. Negative spillovers of the lack of in-
vestments in road infrastructure include not only the comfort and safety of passengers 
but also the logistics of national corporations and the competitiveness of exports. In 
fact, a relevant subset of the system has historically been in very bad conditions and 
thus constraining the growth of the interstate travel market. This situation, along with 
the recent economic liberalization measures of the domestic airline industry and the 
consequent fall in air fares, have been stimulating travelers to increasingly consider 
air transportation in their choice set.
Historically, the strict regulation of the road transportation market led to a virtual 
absence of competition between carriers. The regulatory framework not only inhibited 
new entry and sustained a high concentration level but also prevented incumbents 
to engage in price competition. This situation led to a significant lack of efficiency 
and low productivity until recently, in such a way that some analysts used to refer to 
the sector as dominated by a “cartel”. Also, until recently, intermodal competition 
between coach and planes was very limited.
FIGURE 1
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Competition by passengers from other modes is relevant only in very specific 
markets. The Brazilian train system is under-developed and the amount of passengers 
carried in interstate routes is overall negligible, except for the regular routes operated 
by only two out of twelve private railways. These two carriers (EFVM and EFC) 
carry only 1.5 million passengers a year4, less than 1% of the total coach passengers. 
Waterways play some role in some states but are also very specific to those regional 
markets. Finally, “self transportation” can be seen as a substitute to passenger trans-
portation services by road, as supported by Guimarães and Salgado (2003).
In 2006, there were 222 interstate coach operators in Brazil, with a fleet of 15.616 
buses. The biggest individual operator, Viação Itapemirim, had a 12.2% share under 
the passengers times kilometers criterion and none of the remaining operators held 
more than 6.4% of the market. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), calculated 
under the assumption of individual operators being independent companies, was 356 
and the CR45 was 0.294. However, actual concentration in relevant markets may be 
quite different from this general calculation, since: i) relevant markets are widely 
recognized as the origin-and-destination pair, thus concentration when appropriately 
calculated will be actually significantly higher than the values just presented. Because 
the service is operated under public delegation, through permits and authorizations, 
most routes are served by a single operator. Competition is allowed in a few routes, 
notably the most important ones, including the shuttle service between Rio de 
Janeiro-São Paulo, which carried 0.7 million passengers a year each way. The latter 
has competition in prices through discounts below the price cap and also in service 
attributes, as the route carries many coach travelers and may have an element of price 
differentiation; ii) there are major economic groups that own several operators in this 
industry so that actual concentration may be also higher for this reason; and iii) there 
is also a factor affecting concentration that is usually not accounted for, namely the 
existence of a growing informal market, so that concentration may be probably lower 
than suggested by calculations using official data, even when the analyst carefully 
considers the economic grouping by capital ownership and the appropriate relevant 
markets6. However, estimating the actual concentration in relevant markets is beyond 
the scope of this study.
The ownership structure is changing rapidly over recent years. Some big merger 
or acquisition deals are taking place with relevant impact on market structure. It is also 
noteworthy that the Gol group has its origins in the coach industry and keeps grow-
ing by acquisitions in both the coach and airline business. In the latter, Gol recently 
incorporated Varig, which was formerly the leading national airline.
The regulatory framework in the coach transportation industry has considerably 
changed since 2000. Regulation of interstate and international lines was transferred 
in 2002 to ANTT - Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres7. Scheduled routes 
are now granted by ANTT through competitive bidding, in a process that requires the 
signature of a contract of concession. The operation of charter coach services is subject 
to a more swift process of authorization. ANTT is taking further steps to enhance 
competition in markets with more density and is also trying to increase transparency 
by publishing relevant information such as tariffs in their website. So far the user can 
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some additional information. However, she will not be able to find out whether an 
operator is offering discounts below the price cap. In 2007, a quasi-deregulation of 
prices was implemented by the Resolution number 1.928/07 of ANTT. Within this 
new regulatory framework, carriers can now have price discrimination within the 
same coach and therefore can put into practice the same yield management tactics 
extensively employed by the airlines. The price cap system is still a biding restric-
tion, however.
III. Modeling Competition Between Alternative Transportation Models
In this section we develop a theoretical framework of competition between trans-
portation modes that can be empirically handled for a test of intermodal interaction. 
Consider the demand of transportation mode i at time t. Assume intermodal competition 
between coaches (i = 1) and airlines (i = 2), and the following demand system:
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where pit and qit are, respectively, the average fare and total quantities of mode i at time 
t. αi are parameters indicative of “absolute advantage in demand” (Dixit, 1979); and 
βii and βij are, respectively, mode-specific own and cross price elasticities of demand. 
Yt is a proxy for income and levels of economic activity and δi is the resulting income 
elasticity. α1, α2, βij, δij > 0, i, j = {1, 2}.
The costs side is modeled in the following way:
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Where TCit is the total cost of mode i at time t and FCit and φit are mode-specific, 
time-varying, costs parameters. FCit is the fixed cost term and 1/φit represents returns 
to density of mode i at time t. Marginal cost and total profits of mode i at time t are, 
respectively, cit = φitqit and πit = pitqit – TCit.
Assume price competition, which implies that modes are static Bertrand op-
ponents. First-order condition for profit maximization (FOC) of mode i at time t is 
then the following:
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where qd qd p it it it ’ = . With some additional manipulation in (3), one has the follow-
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And finally the FOC becomes:
  pq it ii ti t = ηϕ   (5)
where ηi = βii/(βii –1). By plugging (1) into (5) and then manipulating terms one 
has:
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We can therefore reach the best-curve response (reaction function) of mode i 
with respect to rival mode j:
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where µi = 1/(1+βi) and Ri(pjt) is the reaction function of mode i. By considering a 
system of equations R = Ri(pjt), (i, j = 1, 2) it is possible to inspect the existence and 
unicity of a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, which would constitute the solution of (7). 
Under regularity conditions on the parameters in (1) and (2), a unique Nash equili-
brium in prices will emerge.
Equation (7) also permits the researcher to infer the consequences from demand 
and supply shocks in this situation of market equilibrium under intermodal competi-
tion. Figure 2 indicates the effects of exogenous changes in the parameters and the 
resulting Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Suppose the market is initially in F. It is clear that 
a cost shock (an increase in road tolls or in the unit cost of diesel, for example) would 
provoke an upward shift in mode 1’s reaction curve from R1
0(p2) to R1 '(p2), increasing 
prices of both modes to p1 ' and p2 ', and a new Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in G.
Now suppose the entry of a low cost airline. A change in market structure of 
transportation mode 2 (airlines) would cause both curves to become flatter, as a result 
of the increase in the perceived rivalry in the market –by either a decrease in βii or 
an increase in βij, or both. There would be new reaction functions R1 ''(p2) and R2 ''(p1) 
now. The resulting intermodal competition effect would be a change from F to a new 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in H, in which prices of both transportation modes are 
lower (p1 '' and p2 '').
In order to econometrically handle expression (7) we will first perform its lin-
earization by logarithms:
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And finally, let us propose the following specification of cost parameter φit:
  ∆∆ ln ln ϕϕ ϕ it hi hit
h
W =+ ∑ 0   (10)
where Wht is a vector of cost shifters of φit. By inserting (10) into (9):
  ∆∆ ∆∆ ln ln ln pW Y it ii hi hit
h
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We then have the final empirical specification of the pricing equation of trans-
portation alternatives within a framework of intermodal competition:
FIGURE 2
THE EFFECTS OF SHOCKS IN COSTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE
ON EQUILIBRIUM FARES8
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where i = {1,2} and k1i, k2hi, k3 and k4 are parameters of the reaction function.
IV.  The Empirical Approach
Our main objective here is to make inference about coach operators’ pricing 
behavior and above all to infer the significance of intermodal competition in Brazil 
from available data. We perform this empirical test by estimating the sensitivity of 
changes in coach fares to changes in air travel fares once cost and demand observables 
and unobservables are controlled for.
The dataset used for the empirical model was collected from Instituto Basileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), which produces the National System of Consumer 
Price Indexes; more precisely, we used the same data on transportation prices change 
collected for the Extensive National Consumer Price Index - IPCA. It is basically a set 
of monthly series from August 1999 to November 2005, disaggregated for the following 
geographic areas in Brazil: metropolitan regions of Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, 
Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Curitiba and Porto Alegre, Brasília and 
municipal district of Goiânia. We had to drop Belém, Fortaleza and Recife, however, as 
we detected no series of interstate travel price change in the original data, as obtained 
from one of IBGE’s websites9. Therefore, the final sample size had 525 observations 
(j = 7 regions and t = 75 months), in a balanced panel data.
One caveat about the data used here: as the most disaggregated unit of observa-
tion available from IBGE´s dataset was measured at the city-level, one has to be 
cautious when interpreting estimation results, as it is well recognized that the rel-
evant market in transportation is actually the origin-and-destination pair. Therefore, 
our city fares analysis must be interpreted as the study of average behavior across 
origin-and-destination pairs. Besides that, we cannot observe average stage length 
for both coaches and airlines.
In other to develop the empirics, here we follow the airline literature such as 
Borenstein (1989) and Evans and Kessides (1993). We therefore have an empirical 
model of pricing decisions of firms in the market. The empirical framework, consistent 
with the reaction function of (12), is the following:
  ∆∆∆∆ coachk diesel k tirek toll jt jt jt j =+ + 12 3 t t
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  (13)
Where the mathematical operator Δ here means price change (in percentage) 
within one unit of time, that is, ΔXt is approximately equal to (ln Xt – ln Xt–1).
Δcoachjt is the average change in interstate coach fare in city k and time t; Δdieseljt, 
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unit prices of diesel, tire, and tolls in city j and time t; Δairlinejt is the average change 
in the price of air travel in city j and time t. All variables are expressed in real terms, 
that is, once discounted each period’s inflation rate for the consumer (IPCA index).
γj and γt are, respectively, city-specific and time-specific effects, designed to control 
for potential unobservables across cities and time in a two-way panel. They also ac-
count for national time-varying income effects that are common across cities, and for 
income asymmetries between cities that do not change across time. Also, they control 
for time-invariant components of the choice of passengers between coaches and self 
transportation in the local markets. εjt is the error term and κ1,..., κ4 are the unknown 
parameters. It is important to emphasize that, as seen in Section III, the parameter 
κ4 = µiβij = βij /(1+βi) has an important theoretical meaning: it relates the own and 
cross price elasticities of the demand for the modes of transportation. Also, as road 
transportation may be considered an essential good for Brazilian travelers, βi tends to 
be small; therefore, although being an unobservable, κ4 tends to assume a value that 
is close to βij (the cross-price elasticity of demand) and hence may represent a rough 
approximation of the actual substitution patterns by consumers in the market.
Below is Table 1, with some descriptive statistics for the variables in (13); note 
that, for simplicity, indexes k and t are omitted from now on:
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS10
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Δ coach 0.212 3.299 –8.060 15.210
Δ Diesel 0.713 2.628 –6.710 10.560
Δ Tire 0.256 1.990 –6.690 7.000
Δ Toll 0.913 2.887 –3.520 18.970
Δ Airline 0.769 4.193 –19.810 24.440
We treat Δairlinekt as jointly determined with Δcoachkt. In order to account for this 
endogeneity of regressor Δairlinekt we employ simultaneous equations methods. The 
estimator used here is the two-step efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator, and generates coefficient estimates that are efficient in the presence of both 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation of first-order. Also, as (13) 
permits observing, there are both time (months) and section (cities) fixed effects.
In order to properly identify the effects of Δairlinekt, in (13), we need instru-
mental variables that are valid and relevant. By validity we mean orthogonal to the 
error term and by relevance we mean correlated with Δairlinekt. Our methodology is 
similar to the one proposed by Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) to create instru-
ments: we then use airline fare changes in the other remaining cities to instrument 
fare changes in a given city. Additionally, we make use of tests of validity (Hansen J 
test) and relevance (Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio test) to check 30 REVISTA DE ANALISIS ECONOMICO, VOL. 23, Nº 1
whether the instruments are adequate. In both tests, the adequacy of the proposed set 
of instruments is confirmed.
Table 2 presents the estimation results.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATION RESULTS11
Variables Δ Coach
Constant 3.186‡
(1.131)
Δ Diesel 0.267‡
(0.086)
Δ Tire 0.255‡
(0.052)
Δ Toll 0.516‡
(0.136)
Δ Airline 0.311‡
(0.105)
city - Brasília – 0.201
(0.193)
city - Curitiba 0.056
(0.165)
city - Goiânia 0.044
(0.216)
city - Rio de Janeiro 0.234
(0.208)
city - Salvador 0.156
(0.235)
city - São Paulo – 0.118
(0.170)
Adjusted R2 0.833
MSE 1.345
F Statistic 30.310‡
Anderson Statistic 50.360‡
Hansen Statistic 1.390
Number of Observations 525
‡  Significant at 1% level.
With Table 2, it is possible to observe that the coefficients of the cost shifters 
Δdieselkt, Δtirekt and Δtollkt are statistically significant and have the signs in accor-
dance with theory. Δtollkt has the biggest effect on prices, which is possibly due to 
the strong correlation between the higher tolls and the higher quality of service of 
the road infrastructure in São Paulo. In fact, this result of Δtollkt may be indicative 
that coaches make use of the better highways and facilities of the state to charge 
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be concerned with the entry barriers at the highly congested Tietê Terminal in São 
Paulo – the second largest coach terminal in the world.
The pricing model estimated and presented in Table 2 clearly provides some 
evidence on the degree of intermodal competition that characterizes the airline and 
coach industries in Brazil. We tested for the presence of intermodal interaction (prob-
ably due to a substitution effect) among air and road transportation for the interstate 
market, and found a highly significant effect. In fact, one can reject, at one percent of 
significance, the null hypothesis that airline fare variations have no effect on coach 
fare variations. This result is achieved once relevant cost components are accounted 
for – that is, price variation of diesel, tire and toll. This is quite a relevant outcome 
because the coach travel industry is usually regarded as a major cartel in Brazil, that 
is, not subject to internal competitive pressure; thus, the results here indicate that there 
is significant competition stemming from intermodal competition with airlines12.
It is important to emphasize that the interaction between the air and road markets 
for passenger transportation may take place in their borders. Premium coach passengers, 
that is, those who are able to pay for the highest fares as they have higher sensitivity 
to coach quality, are the effective marginal consumers in this market; therefore they 
constitute the small but increasing set of passengers who consider changing means of 
transportation when price differences narrow down. So the airline industry has been 
from time to time appealing to the upper-class coach passengers, who go for flying 
during air fare wars or deep discount periods, and eventually go back to the coach 
service in ordinary periods. The estimated coefficient of Δairlinekt, presented in Table 
2, suggests that cross-elasticities between air and ground transportation of passengers 
are no longer negligible in Brazil but, on the contrary, it is indicative of a situation of 
strong and relevant intermodal interaction. This result has interesting implications for 
competition analysis since it raises the issue on whether the relevant market continue 
to be defined as the individual mode, both for airline and coach cases.
V.  Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to identify and measure potential intermodal com-
petition in the interstate travel market in Brazil. By estimating a reduced-form model 
of pricing decisions of coach operators, it was possible to test whether the intermodal 
interaction between air and road transportation was significant.
Results indicated that coach fares are sensitive to air fares, indicating a very 
significant interaction and potential substitution effect. This is quite a relevant out-
come because the coach travel industry is usually regarded as a major cartel in Brazil 
and therefore not usually subject competitive pressure. The most probable explana-
tion for that is related to the presence of premium coach passengers, with higher 
willingness-to-pay, who go for flying during air fare wars or deep discount periods, 
and eventually go back to the coach service in ordinary periods. It is noteworthy that 
during price war periods long distance air tickets may be priced below coach prices. 
Besides, some services are being upgraded by some coaches and some are being 
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between means of passenger transportation in some relevant markets for premium 
passengers, analogously to what happens in telecommunications although in a much 
less important degree.
In addition, the result challenges the traditional way of defining relevant markets 
for passenger transportation competition in Brazil. The positive cross-elasticities may 
suggest that the product scope of relevant markets in some origin-and-destination pairs 
may be wider than the single mode that is often considered, or at least that the analyst 
should pay closer attention to the intermodal interactions. This may be true not only 
for the interaction between air transportation and coaches, but also for the possibilities 
involving railroads and waterways in some very specific markets inside Brazil.
The empirical analysis performed here also served as a test of the efficacy of the 
recent liberalization measures in both airline and coach industries in inducing more 
efficient and competitive transportation and logistics in Brazil.
Notes
1  Source: 2001 Statistical Yearbook of Transportation of Brazil, available at the website www.geipot.
gov.br/anuario2001/rodoviario/rodo.htm. 
2  Source: IBGE.
3  The United States possesses the most extensive domestic highway system in the world (source: website 
www.estradas.com.br)
4  Urban rail transportation is by far more significant, with 726 million carried in 2006 (ANTT, 2007)
5  Concentration ratio for the top four firms in terms of passengers times kilometers.
6  Some analysts estimate that nowadays the informal market may account for almost fifteen percent of 
the total market in Brazil.
7  States regulate their intra-state routes while munnicipalities regulate their local services.
8  Note that index t is omitted.
9  The IBGE aggregated data bank available at http://www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/. The IPCA series numbers 
were: 5101007 (coach), 5104003 (diesel), 5102010 (tire), 5102015 (toll) and 5101010 (airline).
10  Variables expressed in nominal percentage.
11  Estimated time-specific effects (γt) omitted. Belo Horizonte city is the base-case of the set of city 
dummies.
12  Note that the city effects were not statistically significant, meaning that there is no local-specific com-
ponents of variations in coach fares.
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